Abstract-We consider a wireless sensor network where nodes are randomly distributed in a geographic region. These nodes are battery operated. We assume that these nodes can fail at any time after deployment. These failures may cause shortage of nodes and hence various disability in the network. To overcome this we consider a multiphase wireless sensor network. In such a network, nodes are periodically re-deployed to ensure the connectivity of the network. In this article, we give the analytical results for the number of nodes re-deploy at each generation and average age of a node picked at random from the network. We also gives the condition for that an active link is not compromised when a number of nodes has been compromised.
the most popular schemes used today for secure wireless network is the random key pre-distribution scheme (RKP). The scheme was first introduced by Eschenauer and Gligor [1] and later on extended by Chan, Perrig and Song [2] . Their result is based on the well known random graph model and the classical result on connectivity of the graph by Erdos and Renyi [5] . In RKP, each node is equipped with a set of key called key-ring of size K when deploy. These keys are randomly drawn from a common key-pool of size P maintained at a secure site. The key-ring is then used to form a secure link between a pair of node that shares at least one common key in their respective key-ring. In [4] , authors raise a question under the assumption of full visibility that for a secure wireless network, what should be the size of key-ring and key-pool? Here full visibility means every node can communicate with every other node by using a pair wise secure communication link. In [6] , author's finds out the survivor function i.e. the probability that the graph is k-connected and the expected connectivity for the same random key pre-distribution scheme. A lot of variations of basic RKP schemes are available in the literature. But each of them has their pros and cons.
One drawback of the basic RKP scheme is that when several nodes are compromised there key-ring is exposed to the adversary. So the security of the network is degraded. One possible solution is to periodically refresh the key-pool and reassign the keys to each node. Also the lifetime of a node is limited by their battery power. Also a node can fail or dead at any time after deployment. So the average lifetime of each node is much shorter than the overall operating time of the networks. Hence, it becomes necessary to periodically deploy new nodes as old nodes dead or fail due to some region to ensure the connectivity of the networks. Such a network is called a multi-phase wireless sensor network.
A robust key pre-distribution protocol (RoK) for multiphase wireless sensor networks has been proposed by Claude and Angelo [3] . They partition the key-pool (keyring) into forward key-pool (key-ring) and backward keypool (key-ring). They analytically show that the probability of an active link is compromised is constant.
II. OUR MODEL
The lifetime of a node is limited by their battery power. So a node can destroy at any time after deployment. Here, we use a random key pre-distribution scheme for a multiphase wireless sensor networks. A multiphase wireless sensor network is a network in which nodes that fails at any time are immediately replaced by new nodes to ensure the connectivity of the wireless sensor networks.
Here we assume that n nodes are deployed at bootstrap time (generation 0 , G ). Nodes that die are fail during generation G are immediately replaced by new nodes at generation G . The time between two generations is called generation period.
We assume that a new generation starts after a fixed time period a. We also assume that the lifetime of a node follows the truncated exponential distribution with mean λ and the truncation parameter t. Let X denote the number of nodes deploy at generation G .
So we can formulate X , X , X , … as uniformly and independently distributed random variables.
III. NOTATIONS
Total number of nodes; Critical transmission radius; Size of the Key-Ring; Size of the Key-Pool; Vertex Connectivity; Probability that two nodes share at least one key; 1 − ;
IV. ANALYTICAL RESULTS
The wireless network is exposed to adversary. If a number of nodes are compromised, then all of its keys are expose to the adversary and all the link consist of at least one compromised nodes are also compromised. To ensure the correct operation of the network it is necessary that rest of the network is connected by secure link only. We compute analytically , the fractions of active link compromised indirectly when nodes are compromised. So, the probability that a given key has not been compromised is defined as:
As explained in [2] , the probability p(i) that two nodes share i common keys is defined as:
The Probability p that there is a link between two nodes is equivalent to the probability that two nodes share at least one common key in their respective key-ring can be defined as:
So, the fraction of total communication compromised can be defined as:
Now, we find out the condition on that a link picked at random from the network whose both end nodes are not compromised is not compromised when x nodes are compromised.
Define B be an event such that an arbitrary link l picked at random from the network uses the keyK . Let C be the event that the key K has been compromised. Then the probability that an arbitrary link has been compromised when x nodes have already been compromised can be defined as:
Using, (1 − ) ≤ exp (− ) we get,
Let = and > > , also > 1.
We have that the above probability converges to zero for sufficient large value of n, i.e,
Since nodes can fail or dead at any time after deployment. The fail nodes are re-deploying at the next generation. We are interested in finding out the number of new nodes deploys at each generation. We assume that at generation G there are n nodes in the network i.e. X = n. The nodes died or fails in time interval (0, a), where a is some fixed constant, are replaced by new nodes at generation G . Since the lifetime of a node follows the truncated exponential distribution. So the probability that a node died in time interval (0, a) can be written as:
So, the average number of nodes deploy at generation G is given as:
Let E be the event that a given node dies between
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The number of node deploy at a generation i can be given as:
The lifetime of a node can vary from 0 to t. We want to find out the average age of a node picked at random from the network. Let the current generation is k . Then the number of active nodes deploy i generation ago, denoted as X(i) can be given as the difference of number of nodes deploy at generation G − i and the number of nodes of generation G(k − i) fails in time interval ((k − i)a, ka). So X(i) can be written as:
The probability that a node picked at random has average age i can be given as:
So, the average age E[α] of nodes is defined as:
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section we give simulated results for average number of nodes to redeploy every generation, and the average age of a node. We consider a network with 500 nodes, generation period a = 2, and λ = 1. From the Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 , it is clear that average number of nodes deployed increases in initial few generations and after that became constant, while the fraction of small age of nodes remains almost constant and de-creases of the node of higher ages.
